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The importance 




La importancia de la ética en el papel de los árbitros, es un documento de investiga-
ción que analiza varios casos de arbitraje internacional, desde los que se estudia el valor 
de la neutralidad y de los deberes de los árbitros cuando son partícipes en un conflicto.
Introduction
International Arbitration has become the most effective process to resolve commercial 
disputes between international actors.  Arbitration is attractive for business players becau-
se it (i) creates predictability in the international commercial world; (ii) prevents para-
llel litigation in different countries and, (iii) assures neutrality in the dispute resolution. 
However, if the arbitrators are not ethical “judges”, these benefits will not exist. 
The importance of arbitrators’ ethics has been recognized by international authori-
ties for decades. Recently, two important codified guidelines for arbitrators’ ethics have 
been modified. The American Arbitration Association’s Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in 
Commercial Disputes and the International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration reformed the old Triple A’s Code and IBA Rules res-
pectively. 
This paper intends to compare and contrast the ethical rules that have been modified 
with the new guidelines issued by the organizations mentioned above.  The objectives are 
to explain the development of the ethical rules for arbitrators’ behavior and to discuss the 
scope of the duty of disclosure, material facts to be disclosed, conflicts of interest, and 
the neutrality of the party nominee arbitrator. Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Ca-
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sualty, AT & T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Company, Merit Insurance v. Leatherby Insurance and 
Sunkist v. Sunkist will be the cases discussed as the judicial context of the ethical rules.   
I. Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty
Duty of Disclosure 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental 
Casualty reflects a strict judicial point of view related to the arbitrator’s duty to disclose 
information that could be perceived as a bias in the arbitration proceeding1. 
In Commonwealth Coatings, a subcontractor filed a request for arbitration process to 
recover money for a painting job that he claimed the prime contractor owed him. This 
commercial relationship derived from a principal construction contract. According to an 
agreement to constitute the panel, each party should appoint one arbitrator and the two 
party-arbitrators should select a third neutral arbitrator. However, the third arbitrator had 
business connections with the prime contractor that were never disclosed to the subcon-
tractor. He had served as an engineering consultant for the contractor on many projects, 
including the projects involved in the arbitration. After the award was made, the subcon-
tractor discovered the existing relationship and challenged the award2.
The Supreme Court vacated the arbitration award on the ground that the United Sta-
tes Arbitration Act authorizes vacating an award where it was “procured by corruption, 
fraud or undue means”, or “where there was evident partiality in the arbitrators”3. No-
netheless, the Court recognized that the petitioner in Commonwealth Coatings did not 
charge the arbitrator with fraud or bias in deciding the case, and that the Court had no 
reason, different than the lack of disclosure of the arbitrator’s relationship with the prevai-
ling party, to suspect that the arbitrator acted with improper motives4. 
Thus, what was the real reason for deciding against the award? Was lack of disclosure 
the reason for the Court’s decision? Moreover, was the relationship sufficiently material to 
vacate the unanimous arbitration award?
It seams as if in this case, lack of disclosure was sufficient reason to vacate an arbitra-
tion award, because there were no charges of corruption, fraud, undue means or partiality 
on the part of the arbitrator and the Court did not have a suspicion that the arbitrator 
acted with improper motives. Is it a valid conclusion of the Court that -non disclosure- is 
a material fact to vacate an award? 
1 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
2 Ibíd, 146. 
3 Ibíd, 147.
4 Ibíd, 146.
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For the purpose of the decision in Commonwealth Coatings, the Supreme Court com-
pared the arbitrator’s role with the roles of the Jury and Judge in a judicial proceeding 
and established that arbitration should not be distinguished from judicial process in this 
kind of situation. By interpreting the statutory language, the Court understood that 
the principle that governs to set aside a judicial decision when there is “the slightest pe-
cuniary interest” on the part of the judge is the same concept that governs arbitration 
proceeding5. Accordingly, “the slightest pecuniary interest” from the arbitrator is suffi-
cient ground to vacate or at least, challenge an arbitration award.  But, specifically what 
was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings? Is this 
principle enforceable in private conflict resolution? Do international arbitration rules 
recognize this premise as a valid one? Does the concurring rationale focus on the same 
point? 
As Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall confirmed in their concurring opinion 
in Commonwealth Coatings, arbitrators are not to be held to the judicial standards be-
cause they are “men of affairs” and, as a consequence, they are not disqualified per se by 
their business relationship with any of the parties6.   
In the context of the new Code of Ethics of the American Arbitration Association, 
the Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty ruling is well received although not 
completely unambiguously understood. In Canon I (c), the new code reduces the scope 
of unethical behavior of an arbitrator establishing that after full disclosure of the relevant 
facts, when the parties have agreed to continue with the arbitrator’s appointment or ser-
vices, it is not unethical for the arbitrator to serve his role7. This same idea is explicit in 
Canon II (f ) which says as follow: 
When the parties with knowledge of a person’s interests and relationships, neverthe-
less desire that person to serve as an arbitrator, that person may properly serve8. 
Accordingly, Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall were right in their reasoning 
that if a business relationship exists between the arbitrator and one of the parties, but it 
is known and accepted by both parties, or it is trivial, this is not a disqualifying factor9. 
On the other hand, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest admit the same rule 
that knowledge and acceptance of the relationship by the parties is a valid exception 
for disqualification of an arbitrator. Under the IBA codified ruling, the parties have 30 
days after disclosure to object to an arbitrator’s appointment. If the interested party does 
5 Ibíd, 148. 
6 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. Mr. Justice White, concurring opinion 393 U.S. 
145,150 (1968).
7 The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. A.A.A.. 
8 Ibíd, Canon II (f ). 
9 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. Mr. Justice White, concurring opinion 393 U.S. 
145,150 (1968).
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not raise any objection within that time, he or she has waived any potential conflict of 
interest and the possibility of objecting in a later stage of the proceeding10.  However, the 
IBA guidelines do not establish this rule as an absolute principle. There are some red list 
issues which the parties are compelled not to waive. Those non-waivable issues derived 
from the common law principle that says that “no person can be his or her own judge”11. 
In consequence, these rules limit the autonomy of the parties’ consent in order to obtain 
an impartial arbitration proceeding12. 
Nevertheless, when referring to the duty of disclosure, both rules -the IBA guidelines 
and the Triple A code- focus on the same direction as the concurring rationale of Com-
monwealth Coatings decision does. Non-disclosure is not per se disqualifying, if the facts 
or relationship undisclosed were trivial13.  Therefore, the question is, which facts should 
one disclose? Which facts are trivial? 
The answer to that inquiry should be determined by applying the principle which says 
that when there are doubts to which information one may disclose, those doubts should 
be resolved in favor of disclosure. The new codified ethic rules described above, and the 
Commonwealth Coatings’ decision, stated that any doubt as to whether or not an arbitrator 
ought to disclose some information should be resolved in favor of disclosure14.  Thus, if 
arbitrators err, they should do so on the side of disclosure.
II. A Royal Courts of Justice Decision 
AT & T Corporation v. Saudi Cable Company
Which are Material Facts to be Disclosed?
The Supreme Court of Judicature’s pronouncements In AT & T Corporation v. Sau-
di Cable Company, led us to a more confused stage of uncertainty than Commonwealth 
10 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. International Bar Association, General Standard 
4 (a).
11 Ibíd, Explanation to General Standard 2(d). 
12 As a difference, the AAA Code of Ethics and the Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty decision do not take 
into account the possibility of non-waivable issues on the parties consent. One may understand that Commonwealth 
Coatings and AAA ethics rules leave the door open for the parties to decide whatever they consider the best for their 
arbitration process.     
13 For the IBA guidelines, trivial would be understood as all the facts listed on the permissive green catalog, where there 
is not duty to disclose and, as a consequence, there should not be disqualification of the arbitrator and the process may 
continue without disturbance.
14 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. Mr. Justice White, concurring opinion 393 U.S. 
145,152 (1968); The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. A.A.A., Canon II (d); IBA Guidelines 
on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration, Part One, General Standard 3 (c).
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Coatings’ decision referring to which information one should disclose and when.  While 
Commonwealth Coatings is clear that one may err for disclosure, AT & T v. Saudi takes an 
ambiguous position facing the same issue15.   
In AT & T v. Saudi, AT & T Corporation filed a request for arbitration against Saudi 
Cable Company, trying to solve a dispute derived from a pre-bid agreement for a tele-
communications project (TEP-6). It was a condition for the bidders that cable required 
for the project should be acquired from Saudi Cable Company, and that was the reason 
for existence of the pre-bid agreement involved in the dispute. AT & T and its competi-
tor, Nortel, submitted bids for that project (TEP-6), but the contract was awarded to AT 
& T making Nortel one of the aggrieved bidders16. 
According to the ICC rules that were applicable for this proceeding, each party may 
nominate its own arbitrator subject to confirmation by the ICC and a chairman also sub-
ject to confirmation. Mr. Fortier, an outsider director of Nortel, who was also a minority 
shareholder in Nortel as well as in AT & T, was named the chairman of the panel. The 
information in reference to Nortel connections was never disclosed during the arbitration 
proceeding. Furthermore, the Nortel directorship was omitted from the resume sent to 
the ICC while at the same time, Mr. Fortier sent different resumes to other institutions, 
in which he included his directorship information. This fact, however, was found by the 
court as a secretarial mistake17.     
During that time, the arbitrators’ panel issued three partial awards in favor of Sau-
di Cable Company against AT & T18. In addition, for procedural effects, AT & T had 
to reveal to the panel some confidential information which did not want it to fall in to 
competitors’ hands. Afterward, it was known that Mr. Fortier was an outside director of 
Nortel; therefore AT & T began judicial process to set aside the awards and to remove 
him from the panel19. 
The Supreme Court of Judicature decided against AT&T because it was unable to 
show any grounds for setting aside the awards or removing Mr. Fortier based on bias or 
misconduct. The Court’s rationale was based on the fact that there was no consciously, 
apparent or unconscious bias, or in any matter, misconduct. The Royal Court’s reasoning 
focused on different facts as follow, (i) Nortel was not a party to the arbitration process, 
(ii) the outcome of the projects triggering the dispute would not be a real economic 
15 AT & T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co, 2000 WL 571190 (CA), 5-23-2000 Times 571, 190, (2000).
16 Ibíd, 2. 
17 Ibíd, 3.
18 The first partial award, issued on 4 September 1996, stated that the terms of the pre bid agreement were legally binding 
and that the parties obliged to meet promptly and negotiate in good faith.  The second partial award issued on 2 July, 
1998 concluded that AT & T had not negotiated in good faith with Saudi Cable. On 15 September, 1999, the third 
partial award was issued, establishing the quantum of US$ 30.000.000, plus interest, as partial compensation for Saudi 
Cable.    
19 AT & T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co, 2000 WL 571190 (CA), 5-23-2000 Times 571, 190, (2000).
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benefit or loss for the arbitrator, (iii) the directorship in Nortel was incidental and not 
vital for the arbitrator’s life, (iv) he had no managerial power in Nortel’s day to day life, 
(v) Mr. Fortier is a recognized lawyer and arbitrator and he did not represent a real danger 
for the proceedings’ fairness, and (vi) nothing in the arbitration proceedings showed bias 
because there was not real disposition or prejudice for one party or another, among others 
reasons20.
AT & T v. Saudi, develops a different view of arbitration duty to disclose. As petitioner’s 
counselor properly alleged, Mr. Fortier had plenty of opportunities during different sta-
ges of the arbitration to disclose his connections with Nortel and he did not. He failed 
to disclose his directorship in three different stages of the process, (i) at his statement of 
independence, (ii) when it became apparent that Nortel had been involved as a disap-
pointed bidder, and (iii) when AT&T had to disclose confidential information and it was 
concerned that it could get in competitors’ hands.  However, according to the Court, Mr. 
Fortier failed “innocently” to disclose such information21.  Was this undisclosed infor-
mation sufficiently material to be disclosed? Why, in Commonwealth Coatings, failure to 
disclose relevant information was sufficient ground to vacate the award? Was Mr. Fortier’s 
failure to disclose different in some way from the contractor’s failure to disclose in Com-
monwealth Coatings? Was the standard of review different for each case?
The IBA guidelines on Conflicts of interest offer a non-exhaustive list of situations 
that an arbitrator must disclose22. None of these situations directly encompasses the facts 
of AT & T v. Saudi. However, the chairman in this case had a close relationship with a 
third party, Nortel, which may have had some interest in the outcome of the case, and 
may get some indirect benefit from the defeat of the unsuccessful party. 
Furthermore, an arbitrator’s directorship to one of the parties has significant impor-
tance under the IBA guidelines. This situation is even listed at the non-waivable red ca-
talog. The reason for listing this situation as a non-waivable one is the magnitude and 
weight of a relationship between a director and an enterprise. Accordingly to the IBA un-
derstanding of directorship, when one is a director of an enterprise and one is deciding 
something that could affect this enterprise, one is acting as his own judge23. Even when 
Nortel was not a party to the arbitration process and this non-waivable situation does not 
apply, it was a direct competitor of AT & T in the project involved in the dispute and, 
possibly, in future projects with the same contractor. Therefore, the arbitrator in the pre-
20 Ibíd, 3.
21 Ibíd, 3.
22 The IBA rules have design three different color lists for practical application purposes of the general standards. The red 
color is a catalog of the more serious situations which an arbitrator should disclose to the parties. Some red listed issues 
are waivable and some others are not. The orange color is a record of less serious situations which an arbitrator has the 
duty to disclose. Finally, the green color list is an inventory of trivial facts that the arbitrator has not duty to disclose.  
23 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. International Bar Association, Part II, Practical 
application of the General Standards (2).
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sent case represented an interested party in defeating AT & T and so, there was an evident 
conflict of interests. Was this a material fact to be disclosed at some stage of the procee-
ding? If it was a material fact, why the award was not vacated? 
One may believe, as the Court did, that Mr. Fortier’s failure to disclose was an inno-
cent fact. Nevertheless, one may not forget that his failure lasted throughout the whole 
arbitration process. From an objective point of view, Mr. Fortier’s failure to disclose could 
appear to be innocent only until AT & T expressed its concern about the discovery of 
confidential information that could fall on competitors’ hands. He was the competitor, 
and he did not disclose it24. Thus, what is the scope of duty of disclosure?     
III. Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company
Immaterial Facts and Impartiality
In Merit Insurance v. Leatherby Insurance, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
seventh circuit recognized that the standards of disqualification for arbitrators are less 
strict than for judges25. This recognition is standing on the side of Mr. Justice White and 
Mr. Justice Marshall concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, where they affirmed 
that arbitrators, as men of affairs, can not be held by the strict principles of the judicial 
process26. 
The interesting part of Merit Insurance’s decision, is that the Court acknowledged that 
in order to get the expertise required in a specific arbitration proceeding, the parties must 
be open to accept arbitrators that may know the parties by their prior contact with the 
industry27. 
In Merit Insurance, the Court made a balancing exercise between impartiality and ex-
pertise under two different scenarios, the judicial system and the arbitration process, and 
concluded that the weight of those concepts differs depending on the scenario in which 
it is analyzed. According to the Court, arbitration is a way to obtain expertise in a dispu-
te resolution, and as a consequence, arbitrators must know the business, and maybe, the 
parties involved. That means that in arbitration proceedings, impartiality is a little bit sa-
crificed in order to obtain an expert’s award. On the other hand, the judicial system must 
24 The IBA ethic’s guidelines as well as the AAA ethic’s rules do not make any difference between an insider director 
of an enterprise and an outsider. Moreover, the IBA rules in it General Standard 2, stated that a board member of 
an enterprise has it same identity, and under that understanding Mr. Fortier had the same identity that Nortel, the 
competitor of AT & T. See IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. International Bar 
Association, Explanation to General Standard 2 (d), May 2004.   
25 Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company 714 F.2d 673 (1983).
26 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
27 Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company 714 F.2d 673, 679 (1983).
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be impartial, rather than expert, because it is a branch of the governmental power and its 
legitimacy depends on impartiality. 
Merit Insurance’s decision is, once again, the Court’s forgiveness of an arbitrator’s fai-
lure to disclose. 
Were the facts so trivial that they did not deserve to be disclosed? Is failure to disclose 
a reason for setting aside an award? What happened with Commonwealth Coatings’ majo-
rity decision?      
In 1972 Merit Insurance and Letherby Insurance were parties in a reinsurance con-
tract. Merit Insurance sued Letherby in a Federal District Court for fraud in inducing the 
contract28. Letherby moved to arbitration according to prior agreement. The arbitration 
was conducted under the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. Each party ap-
pointed one arbitrator and together the parties appointed a “neutral” arbitrator named 
Jack Clifford29. 
At the first meeting the arbitrators decided that all of them were going to act as neutral 
arbitrators. The arbitration process lasted more than three (3) years and, as a result, there 
was a unanimous award of more than ten million dollars for Merit Insurance. At the judi-
cial level for confirmation of the award, Leatherby alleged that one of the party-nominee 
arbitrators had been biased. However, the court confirmed the award30. 
During appeal proceeding, Leatherby filed a motion alleging that the “neutral arbitra-
tor” Mr. Clifford, fourteen (14) years ago worked for the actual president and principal 
shareholder of Merit Insurance, while he was working in Cosmopolitan. On that base, 
and taking into account the failure to disclose the past relationship between the third 
arbitrator and the party’s president, the District Court set aside the arbitration award31. 
Merit Insurance appealed and the Appeals Court reversed the decision and remanded in 
order to reinstate the award32.
The United States Court of Appeals observed two factors of great importance related 
to arbitrator’s ethics, (i) the materiability of the relationship between the arbitrator and 
the party, and (ii) the spirit of the ethical rule of disclosure in the old Code of Ethics of 
Triple A.
To reach the decision, the United States Court of Appeals analyzed that the past rela-
tionship between Mr. Clifford and the president of Merit Insurance was not a close rela-
tionship, but only a professional one, and that it ended fourteen (14) years ago thus there 
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decision, the Court did not use the “trivial relationship” test, but rather it used the “inti-
mate relationship” test33. 
Accordingly, an intimate arbitrator-party past relationship would be a material fact 
to be disclosed and a strong consideration for setting aside an arbitration award. In the 
Court words, the relationship must be “so intimate, personally, socially, professionally, or 
financially, as to cast serious doubt” on the arbitrator’s impartiality34. 
In addition, the Court evaluated Mr. Clifford’s failure to disclose under the previous 
Code of Ethics that provided that disclosure was intended to be applied realistically so 
that it did not become impracticable35. 
Regarding the issue of disclosure under the ethical rules, the Court concluded that, 
although, failure to disclose could be a violation of the arbitrators’ ethical standards it did 
not mean that the arbitration award should be nullified judicially36.  The inquiry of an 
award’s validity must be analyzed under Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act 
because the ethical rules do not have the force of the law37. 
What is the point of establishing ethical standards if they are not enforceable? What is 
the applicability and enforceability of the arbitrators’ ethical duties?   
IV. Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. Del Monte Corporation v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc.
Neutrality of the Party Nominee Arbitrator
In Sunkist v. Sunkist, the United States Court of Appeals for the eleventh circuit, ba-
sed upon the Canon VII of the Triple A previous Code of Ethics, declared that party ap-
pointed arbitrators may be permitted, and should be expected to be predisposed towards 
the party who appointed them38. This affirmation encompasses Merit Insurance’s decision 
33 Nevertheless, the Court compared Merit Insurance with Chitimacha a case that held that a district judge did not 
have to disqualify himself from a case in which the defendant was a corporation which he had represented in private 
practice. That relationship was trivial because it has terminated six (6) years ago.   
34 Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company 714 F.2d 673, 680 (1983).
35 The spirit of the old standard of disclosure under the Triple A previous code, was very confusing. The duty to disclose 
was limited from the beginning without any legitimate reason, leaving on the air the understanding of permission 
of non disclosure. The new Triple A ethical rules do not say anything similar to that permissive duty to disclosure. 
Instead, the new Code of Ethics makes an stricter approach of disclosure establishing in its II canon (d) that any doubt 
as to disclosure concerns should be resolved in favor of disclosure.   
36 Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company 714 F.2d 673, 680 (1983).
37 Ibíd.
38 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 10 F. 3d 753 (1993).
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which affirmed that impartiality is a principle subordinated to expertise in arbitration 
proceeding39. Merit Insurance stated that the importance of expertise over impartiality is 
“dramatically illustrated by the practice whereby each party appoints one of the arbitra-
tors to be his representative rather than a genuine umpire40”. 
There were two issues in Sunkist v. Sunkist. One was associated with a nonsignatory 
to a contract invoking an arbitration provision, and the second one was related to party 
appointed arbitrator’s ethics41. For the purpose of this paper we will focus only on the se-
cond issue of discussion. 
Sunkist Grower and General Cinema Corporation were parties on an orange soda 
deal. Cinema Corporation created a wholly owned subsidiary named Sunkist Soft Drinks 
that entered into a license agreement with Sunkist Grower which contained an arbitration 
clause. A couple of years later, in 1984, Del Monte Corporation acquired Sunkist Soft 
Drinks and absorbed it into is beverage products division. In 1986 Del Monte and Sun-
kist Soft Drinks filed a declaratory relief action against Sunkist Grower in order to obtain 
a declaration that the controversy relating to Sunkist Soft Drinks’ performance under the 
license agreement was subject to arbitration. After the complaint was filed, Sunkist Soft 
Drinks was sold to another company, Cadbury Schweppes, Inc., a fact that was reflected 
in an amendment to the original complaint42. There was a whole procedural development 
in California and Georgia that ended up in Georgia with a granted motion to compel ar-
bitration filed by Del Monte43.  
The parties applied the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules to constitute 
the arbitrators panel and for the purposes of the subsequent proceeding. Each party ap-
pointed an arbitrator and mutually agreed upon a third neutral arbitrator. Del Monte ap-
pointed Mr. Meyers as its party-nominee arbitrator44. 
Before the arbitration process began Mr. Meyers met with counsel and other represen-
tatives of Del Monte to prepare for the hearing. A third party witness was interviewed in 
Mr. Meyers’ presence. However, after being designated as an arbitrator to the process Mr. 
Meyers submitted a written disclosure as it is required by the Triple A rules45. 
Sunkist Grower filed a motion to the Triple A requesting that Mr. Meyers was not con-
firmed as arbitrator to the process based upon his prior contact with the possible witness. 
The Triple A confirmed Mr. Meyers’ appointment and Sunkist Grower brought action to 
39 Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company 714 F.2d 673 (1983).
40 Ibíd, 679.  
41 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 10 F. 3d 753 (1993).
42 This amendment to the complaint also added Nabisco Brands, Inc. 
43 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 10 F. 3d 753, 755 (1993).
44 Ibíd, 756.
45 Ibíd, 756.
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the District Court which declined to rule on the merits of the motion because it was too 
premature46. The panel entered in a two-to-one decision for Del Monte. 
At the confirmation level, Sunkist Grower moved to vacate the award on the grounds 
of misconduct on Mr. Meyers’ part. The Court denied the motion to vacate the award 
and, instead, confirmed it. Sunkist Grower appealed the decision and the Court affirmed 
the confirmation of the award47.    
The Court of Appeals relied on the fact that Mr. Meyers was a party-appointed ar-
bitrator and that Triple A old Code of Ethics recognized different rules for neutral and 
noneutral arbitrators, imposing less and more flexible duties to nonneutral arbitrators48. 
In harmony to the old Code of Ethics, party-nominee arbitrators, like Mr. Meyers, 
may be predisposed toward the party that appointed them. Thus, if nothing different was 
said, there was a permissible non impartial way of acting for the party-nominee arbitra-
tors. However, that permission was not absolute because they were obligated to act in 
good faith, integrity and fairness49. The Court analyzed Mr. Meyers’ conduct under the 
standard of good faith, integrity and fairness and found that he had acted in accordance 
with the valid ethical rules and that there was no misconduct in his behavior. As a conse-
quence, the Court sustained the arbitration award. 
For today’s Triple A Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, there are 
no arbitrators known as “nonneutral”. The valid Code establishes that party-appointed 
arbitrators which are expected by the parties to be predisposed toward the party that ap-
pointed them should be known as Canon X arbitrators50.
On the other hand, if nothing has been said about arbitrators’ neutrality, all arbitra-
tors are presumed to be neutral and are expected to comply with the same standards as 
the third arbitrator51.  
Which would have being the outcome of Sunkist v Sunkist under the new ethical rules? 
Would the new presumption change the Court’s point of view?
The presumption of neutrality of party-appointed arbitrators is an important change 
of the ethical rules. The previous Code of Ethics stated that party-appointed arbitrators 
should be considered nonneutrals unless both parties informed the arbitrators that all 





50 The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. A.A.A., March. Canon IX (B).
51 Ibíd, Canon IX (A).
52 The Introductory Note of Canon VII of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes of 1977, stated as 
follows: “. . .In all arbitrations in which there are two or more party-appointed arbitrators, it is important for everyone 
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different rule, because the Triple A presumes that the panel is composed by neutral 
arbitrators, unless something different is said53. Accordingly, the standard of neutrality 
rolled completely to the other side.  But, is it better now than before?
V. Stef Shipping Corporation v. Norris Grain Co.  
Do party-appointed Arbitrators have to be impartial?
In Stef Shipping v Norris Grain, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York concluded that party-appointed arbitrators are not to be neutral or 
wholly impartial54. This decision is guided by the same direction as Sunkist v. Sunkist whe-
re the Court understood that predisposition is a real fact in the mind of party-nominee 
arbitrators55. 
In September 1959, the parties entered into a charter party which involved the use of 
a Liberian flag vessel owner by Stef Shipping Corporation. Certain disputes arose and, 
pursuant to prior agreement, the parties referred the matter to arbitration. To create the 
panel, each party appointed an arbitrator and the two selected arbitrators would decide 
the nomination of the third arbitrator. However, they could not get in to an agreement, 
so by the parties’ petition the Court ended selecting the neutral arbitrator56.   
During the proceeding, each counsel charged the other party-appointed arbitrator 
with different complaints of misconduct. This situation finished with the voluntary resig-
nation of one of the arbitrators. Nevertheless, the other two arbitrators decided the matter 
and issued an arbitration award57. 
Stef Shipping Corporation brought suit to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds 
that (i) Norris Grain’s party nominee arbitrator was guilty of misconduct and evident par-
tiality, and (ii) that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by issuing an arbitration award 
while Stef Shipping’s party-appointed arbitrator had resigned. The Court denied Stef 
Shipping’s motion to vacate the arbitration award finding that that the arbitrators’ panel 
concerned to know from the start whether the party-appointed arbitrators are expected to be neutrals or non-neutrals. 
In such arbitrations, the two party-appointed arbitrators should be considered non-neutrals unless both parties inform 
the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be neutral, or unless the contract, the applicable arbitration rules or any 
governing law requires that all arbitrators are to be neutral. . .”   
53 The Canon IX (A) of the new Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes from March 2004, establishes 
presumption of neutrality as follows:  “. . .In tripartite arbitrators ti which this Code applies, all three arbitrators are 
presumed to be neutral and are expected to observe the same standards as the third arbitrator.”
54 Stef Shipping Corporation v. Norris Grain Co. 209 F. Supp. 249 (1962).
55 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 10 F. 3d 753 (1993).
56 Stef Shipping Corporation v. Norris Grain Co. 209 F. Supp. 249, 251 (1962).
57 Ibíd, 252.
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had not exceeded their power and that there was not misconduct on the party-nominee 
arbitrator for Norris Grain58.
On the issue related to misconduct, the Court stated that the party-nominee arbitra-
tor “can not be expected to play a wholly impartial part”59 because “they are partisans one 
removed from the actual controversy”60. 
Which is the impartiality due by a party-appointed arbitrator? Is it less than the third 
arbitrator’s impartiality? Is it none? 
Stef Shipping was decided in 1962, even before the previous Triple A Code of Ethics 
was issued. It is an old decision raised under old standards, but it is still cited by the courts 
in their written opinions. Is it still a valid precedent?
The new Code of Ethics of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) has change 
the presumption of neutrality on party-appointed arbitrators to the other side. Under 
these new ethical rules, a party-appointed arbitrator is presumed to be neutral unless so-
mething different is said and he/she has the duty to disclose any facts which may affect 
his/her neutrality61. Would Stef Shipping outcome change under the new Code of Ethics 
for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes? 
On the other hand, the International Bar Association (IBA) Rules of Ethics for Inter-
national Arbitrators and Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest do not distinguished duties 
for party-appointed arbitrators and third arbitrators. The codified rules seam to be struc-
tured in a way where one can conclude that all arbitrators are expected to be impartial. 
The Guidelines first General Principle establishes as follows: 
Every arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the time of ac-
cepting an appointment to serve and shall remain so during the entire arbitration pro-
ceeding until the final award has been rendered or the proceeding has otherwise finally 
terminated62. 
There is no doubt that under this principle even a party-nominee arbitrator must re-
main neutral and impartial. Stef Shipping would have probably been decided differently if 




61 The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. A.A.A. Note on Neutrality.
62 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. International Bar Association, Part I, General 
Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure (1).
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Conclusions
Despite all the recognition of the efforts for defining ethical standards for arbitrators’ 
role, the new codified norms and the judicial environment do not make clear the scope 
of duty to disclose information, the materiability of the facts to be disclosed, or even, the 
neutrality of party-appointed arbitrators. However, there are a couple of conclusions that 
one may consider as valid.
1. Disclosure
Disclosure of relevant information and conflicts of interests is a duty owed by all ap-
pointed arbitrators during the whole arbitration proceeding. The codified rules make 
clear that whenever there are doubts on which information one may disclose those doubts 
should be resolved in favor of disclosure. However, this is a principle that is not very clear 
and defined in judicial precedents. 
In addition, non disclosure is not per se a disqualifying factor or a definitive ground to 
vacate an arbitration award.
2. Materiability
Although the codified rules are unambiguous in the principle that says that doubts 
related to disclosure should be resolved for disclosure, when the fact is not material the 
arbitrator has no duty to disclose it.  The question then becomes which facts are material 
and which facts are not material. 
The IBA guidelines are clear, at least as possible, in this issue. Those guidelines deter-
mined a list of different facts that should be disclosed. In addition, the list establishes the 
importance of the fact and the possible effects of non disclosure. On the other hand, Tri-
ple A rules are not that clear but are along the line of prevailing disclosure. 
Nevertheless, the judicial thinking has stated that trivial relationships do not need to 
be disclosed. So when there is not disclosure of a trivial relationship the award is in perfect 
shape. The problem becomes the definition of the concept of triviality. 
An arbitrator must disclose any intimate relationship with any of the parties because 
it is a material fact. The relationship must be “so intimate, personally, socially, professio-
nally, or financially, as to cast serious doubt” on the arbitrator’s impartiality63. Lack of in-
timacy then, will become lack of materiability.
63 Merit Insurance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company 714 F.2d 673, 680 (1983).
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3. Party-appointed arbitrators, neutrality and impartiality
Under the new ethical rules of Triple A for arbitrators, all arbitrators are presumed to 
be neutral. This is a presumption that can be rebutted by agreement of the parties, or by 
contract, that determines that those arbitrators should act as Canon X arbitrators. This is 
a change in the standard of 180 grades because if nothing is said, arbitrators may remain 
neutrals. 
The IBA rules do not differentiate between party-appointed arbitrators and third ar-
bitrators. Those rules establish that unless something different is said, a common and pri-
mary rule governs, that is that arbitrators must be impartial.
However, the courts have defined that expectation of impartiality in arbitration proce-
edings can not be the same as in the judicial system. In arbitration, impartiality valuated 
less than expertise.   
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